Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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"There is...," philosophy: it is the question whether the talk that "there is" something is synonymous with the assumption of the existence of the said thing. In contrast to that the existential quantification is the attribution of properties to objects. See also everyday language, existence, existential quantification, existence predicate, existence statements, quantification, attribution, properties, schematic letters.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Uwe Meixner on There is (/Existence) - Dictionary of Arguments

I 23f
Existence/topicality/ontology/Meixner: it is not conceptually natural that something that exists, really is.
>Reality
, >"There is", >Possibility, >States of affairs,
>Ontology.
It is however vice versa: everything what is real exists.
"There is": is unclear.
Meixner per empty categories, pro unrealized possibility as a fact, not an individual.
>Categories, >Possibilia, >Possibilism, cf. >Actualism.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27
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